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The 'tragic dilemma' of the CNT in the Spanish Revolution

category iberia | history of anarchism | debate author Monday January 01, 2007 06:06author by Javier Report this post to the editors

Debate on the entry of the Spanish anarchists into government and the alternatives

The Spanish Revolution is one of the key events in the history of the Anarchist movement, it was the moment in wich it was in the best position to put into practice its revolutionary vision. It also was the moment in wich the problems a revolution will undoubtedly face and to wich the anarchist movment MUST give a practical answer were most clear. In this piece, Sam Dolgoff reviews the dilemma presented by the experience of anarchist militants in the Spanish Revolution, the different alternatives and a balanced view of their implications. In this, he makes justice to the memory of so many comrades, who left and gave everything during the struggle for a free Spain.

Many in the anarchist camp have adopted a purist position and started to look for a bureaucracy in the CNT and corrupted militants who would be responsible for its un-anarchistic involvement in the republic`s government. By this they support the thesis that nothing is wrong with anarchism, that all the correct answers have long been found and it was just a case of deviationism, wich will not be repeated of course. This is the case of Vernon Richards according to Sam Dolgoff. Here he shows both the position to be wrong and the historical claims it uses to advance its arguments as baseless. His critique however has a disturbing detail, he clarifies the situation clearly stating that there was a dilemma (and that the CNT, not only a small group of leaders, did indeed choose between two options) between collaboration and dictatorship, but rejects both alternatives leaving the question open for the anarchist movement to start answering. It is still a task for which the movement has not shown to be in a condition to cope with.

As to the other alternative (not throughly covered byt this article), an anarchist dictatorship, there are two variants. One (purism) is the kind that Richards supports according to Sam Dolgoff, that is that nothing is wrong, anarchism has all the answers, that was deviationism. The other could be called the revisionist position, altough it presents itself as a clarification of misunderstandings in anarchism, an answer to confusionism and ambiguities (which undoubtedly are to be found in the anarchist movement as it is not even an organization but a tradition in a very loose sense, except if one starts to "excomulgte" other tendencies as not truly anarchist). It could be argued that the Friends of Durruti group (and many plataformists today) are proponents of the "anarchist dictatorship" alternative, altough they say it ambiguosly (see The Friend of the People, the Friends Of Durruti press). In this, they coincide to some extent with the bolsheviks, who faced the same dilemma in Russia but choose dictatorship (a decision that leninists have clinged to even after its catastrophic results have been made crystal clear by history itself). One example of such position could be that in Workers Solidarity 34 available online at:
http://struggle.ws/ws92/fod34.html

Let this historical piece be a good start for this debate.

(I cannot stress this enough, I am writing this at my sole responsibility. In no way should my ideas and doubts be associated with my organization -that is why I will not even mention it- as we do not currently have a collective position on this issue)



CONTROVERSY: ANARCHISTS IN THE SPANISH REVOLUTION


by Sam Dolgoff

In 1974, or early 1975, I reviewed in the English anarchist paper Freedom a book by Carlos Semprun Maura, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Catalonia (French edition). In my review I criticized both Semprun Maura and Vernon Richards' book Lessons of the Spanish Revolution for presenting a distorted, over-simplified interpretation of events- a scenario. This provoked a heated rejoinder from Richards (three or four articles in Freedom).

Over forty years after the tragic defeat of the Spanish Revolution - 1936 to 1939 - the question of anarchist participation in the Republican government and the role of anarchists in a revolution is a fundamental problem still debated- still relevant. I include my polemic with Richards in these memoirs because of the emotional impact of these stormy years and the great extent to which these events influenced my thinking and the course of my life.

Since Richards' main source for his criticism of the anti-anarchist policies of the CNT-FAI governmental participation - are the anti-participation historians Jose Peirats and Gaston Leval (Level's Collectives in the Spanish Revolution was translated by Richards), I refer, in the main, to both Peirats and Leval to refute his contentions. Richards writes like a prosecuting attorney, but I do not consider myself a lawyer for the defense. No one can be altogether objective but I have done my best to present a well-documented, impartial analysis of the issues involved.

Both Semprun Maura's and Richards' "bete noir" is the CNT-FAI "bureaucracy." For them, the "bureaucracy" is to a great extent responsible for the defeat of the anarchist revolution. That a "few officials became infected with the virus of power" (as Leval puts it) is true enough. But to charge that the CNT degenerated into a virtual bureaucratic dictatorship is a gross exaggeration, bordering on slander.

Richards' attempt to refute my statement that the CNT was so structured as to reduce the danger of bureaucracy to a minimum only shows that he does not know what he is talking about. He inadvertently admits that he has no real evidence to substantiate the existence of the alleged "bureaucracy": "I have never seen detailed accounts of the composition [of the bureaucracy], its role, or whether [the bureaucrats] are paid or unpaid...."

Abel Paz, who fought in the Revolution, in his eyewitness account, Durruti: The People Armed (pp. 244-5), tells how Durruti, always alert to the dangers of bureaucracy, investigated:

...the national headquarters of the CNT were not centralized. All the people working in the national headquarters and in the organization were employed, not by the National Committee, but were elected by and accountable to the plant assemblies. They were paid not by the National Committee, but by enterprises in which they were employed....

Both Augustin Souchy, who administered the Foreign Information Bureau of the CNT, and one of his coworkers, Abe Bluestein, of New York, told one that everyone working in the National Headquarters from responsible officials to porters and maintenance workers were paid the same equal wages. Durruti and others who investigated were convinced that there was no bureaucracy in the CNT anywhere.

The contention that the anarchist "leaders" joined the Catalan "Generalidad" government without consulting the members is also false. Peirats, in an interview with John Brademas (12 September 1952) informed him that the decision to join the "Generalidad" government was adopted by a vast majority vote in the Plenum of Local and District Federations. (Anarcho-Syndlicalism and Revolution in Spain, Spanish translation, pp. 211, 214).

As I write these lines I read a review by my old friend and comrade Abe Bluestein further emphasizing this point:

...and I saw equally strong commitment to anarchist principles in Barcelona. I saw a regional meeting of the CNT with more than 500 representatives affirm the policy of participating in the government of Catalonia. At the same time, they voted to continue financial support to the Libertarian Youth of Catalonia who opposed such government collaboration publicly in their uncensored leaflets and pamphlets distributed throughout the city. [Social Anarchism No. 7, P. 9]

The accusation that there was no control from below is emphatically denied by Gaston Leval in his chapter on libertarian democracy. Leval, after describing in meticulous detail the democratic libertarian procedures embedded in the nature and structure of libertarian organization, declares that libertarian procedures, the fullest people's direct grass-roots democracy, were practiced

...in ALL the syndicates THROUGHOUT SPAIN. In ALL trades and industries. In assemblies which in Barcelona brought together - hundreds of thousands of workers.... In ALL the collectivized villages... which comprised at least 60% of Republican Spain's agriculture. [Collectives in the Spanish Revolution, Freedom Press, p. 206- Leval's emphasis]

In its report to the Extraordinary Congress of the International Workers' Association (IWA-anarchosyndicalist), the National Committee of the CNT refuted charges that the National Committee violated anarchist federalist principles by imposing its own decisions on the rank-and-file local and regional organizations. The decision to join the Catalan government "Generalidad" was ratified by plenums of local, district and regional committees in August 1936 and the decision to join the central government was ratified in a national plenum of regions in Madrid on 28 September 1936 (the CNT actually entered the government on 6 November 1936). From 19 July 1936 to 26 November 1937, seventeen regional plenums and dozens of local plenums and district federations were called as well as various regional congresses of unions. (See Jose Peirats, Anarchists in the Spanish Revolution, pp. 185, 186.)

The replacement of the brutal professional police, the Civil Assault Guards, far from being as Richards contends an "...example of a politicized bureaucracy," constitutes one of the truly great achievements of the revolution. His own evidence contradicts his charge that the patrols received orders from the government. The patrols were chosen not by the government but by the people themselves: "various organizations and parties, CNT-FAI, UGT etc...." (Richards)

Richards and other critics do not seem to grasp the magnitude of the tragic dilemma of our comrades, the Spanish anarchists. The libertarian movement was hopelessly trapped between the cruel choice of collaboration with its anti-fascist enemies, thereby violating the principles of anarchism, or trying to establish an anarchist dictatorship over all the other anti-fascist organizations, an obvious impossibility and even greater violation of anarchism, or accepting, at least partially, the awesome historic responsibility for a fascist victory.

What the CNT-FAI should or should not have done in such desperate circumstances is, of course, debatable. What is not debatable is that there is a dilemma. I criticized Semprun Maura because he called this, the most crucial problem of the Spanish Revolution, "a false dilemma" and I criticized Richards because he labelled it "Dolgoff's dilemma."

"Dolgoff's dilemma" is, however, shared by Gaston Leval, Jose Peirats and almost all other anticollaborationists as well as all responsible non-anarchist writers on Spain. Leval graphically portrays the tragic, heartbreaking situation that our comrades had to face far more truthfully, with far greater understanding than Richards and the "pure" anarchist critics:

All those among the anarchists preoccupied primarily with the revolutionary question oversimplified and overestimated the political problem. The Social Revolution, they believed, would sweep away the state and the other entrenched authoritarian institutions... but the necessity of fighting the war against fascism upset these expectations....

While the state was severely crippled after the fascist attack of 19 July 1936, it was by no means as impotent as is generally assumed. All the machinery of the state was still intact; the ministries, and their officials, a police force, an army though weakened, and the entrenched bureaucracy still survived... notwithstanding the over-optimism of the revolutionaries, the state still constituted an effective force in many provinces and cities... it was only in three or four cities (Barcelona was the most important) that the anarchists dominated the situation, and then only for three or four weeks... it is therefore fallacious to assume that the anarchists were the masters of the situation....

Another serious problem was that in all of Eastern Spain there were no arms factories, no raw materials, no iron or coal. The principal arms factories were in fascist territory....

It is obvious that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to make the Revolution under such circumstances... it became necessary to collaborate with our anti-fascist enemies against the much more dangerous common enemy. We could not sweep away the political parties controlling the municipalities, who with equal fervor were fighting with the anarchists against fascism.
[see Leval, Ni Franco- Ne Stalin, pp. 76, 94]

Richard ignores a most revealing passage in Peirats' Anarchists in the Spanish Revolution (English translation, p. 188):

We all understood perfectly that leading to the period of collaboration was a chain of events that placed the CNT in a helpless situation... the only alternative of those who consistently opposed collaboration with the government... was a heroic defeat... they could offer no solution that would simultaneously preserve victory in the war against fascism; progress in the revolution; complete loyalty to their ideas and the preservation of their own lives... they lacked the power to perform miracles...

The situation was all the more aggravated by the fact that the millions of sincere rank-and-file workers, socialists belonging to the Socialist Party-controlled General Workers Union (UGT), republicans, Catalan and Basque separatists, petit-bourgeois peasant owners, etc., by far outnumbered the CNT-FAI members. Gaston Leval emphasizes this point:

The vast majority of the population living in the republican part of Spain were, above all, dominated by the fear of a fascist victory. They did not understand why all the political parties and social movements did not constitute a united anti-fascist front regardless of their ideological differences. The people wanted the CNT and the much less important FAI to join the united front government which was, for them, absolutely necessary to guarantee the defeat of fascism.... [Collectives In the Spanish Revolution, Freedom Press, p. 322]

Nor were all the members of the CNT convinced, uncompromising anarchists. They, too, insisted that the CNT should collaborate with the anti-fascist parties and even enter the government. On this important point Peirats takes issue with Richards:"realities are and always will be more decisive than philosophical speculation.... It is unrealistic to expect absolute fidelity to principles in an organization like the CNT, numbering millions...."

Leval explodes the myth that the CNT-FAI "bureaucracy" supinely capitulated to the counter-revolutionary Republican government:

The leaders of the CNT-FAI, first of all, did what they could not to give in [join the government-S.D.]. They were undoubtedly inspired by their traditional opposition to all governmentalism... and all government parties. But in the face of the growing danger [fascist victory-S.D.] the greatest unification possible was needed. They thought up a revolutionary solution: the government should be replaced by a Defense Council of five members, five from the UGT, four from the republican parties, five members of the CNT. In this way they sought to make clear the supremacy of workers' syndical organizations over the political parties. [Ibid., p. 3221

The CNT proposal was made not by the "leaders," but only after thorough discussion by the National Plenum of Regions in Madrid, 3 September 1936. The proposal was published in the CNT and republican press.

Needless to say the proposal was rejected by the 1,200,000 Socialist Party-controlled labor union UGT and also rejected by the political parties. Leval, in my opinion, was absolutely right in making a distinction between an ordinary parliamentarian government of political parties and one conducted by a coalition of genuine labor organizations, not by any means a perfect libertarian solution, but one in which workers' organizations certainly exercise a greater measure of control.

Leval also notes that the successful organization of the libertarian collectives was to a great extent undoubtedly due to the fact that in Granollers, Gerona, Hospitalet, Valencia and many other centers the mayors were libertarians and they expedited social transformation (ibid., p. 281). Since the CNT was forced to collaborate with other anti-fascists in village, municipal and provincial governments, it stands to reason that it was just as unanarchistic as participating In the national government. If I were a consistent anti-collaborationist I would oppose collaboration not only in the central government but also its subdivisions, without which any government is inconceivable.

Leval even goes so far as to defend a libertarian proposal to establish a national state financed health insurance fund:

That libertarians should have thought of such a solution which implies the recognition of the existence of the state... may surprise - and shock the theoreticians who ignore the practical facts.... As we have repeated many times, we were in a mixed and most complicated situation in which private capital and individual property persisted, in which the socialized economy paid taxes, etc.... In this situation many activities escaped our control.... [ibid., p. 273]

In respect to the refusal of the anarchists to "take power," for which the Trotskyites and assorted "Marxist-Leninists" also criticized them, Leval remarks:

It only needs a modicum of common sense to realize that it was quite impossible for us to wage war against the other anti-fascist sectors who would not allow themselves to be wiped out so easily. It would have been a nonsense and a crime.... [ibid., p. 82]

These quotations (and the anti-participationist literature is filled with more) read like justifications for governmental participation. There are undoubtedly quotations from the same sources refuting such statements. But these contradictions reflect the tragic dilemma of our valiant comrades. What is most disturbing is Richards' refusal to take these facts into account, instead misleading his readers by concocting a false account of the situation in Spain: selecting and twisting only the kind of "facts" which support his baseless arguments and accusations.

Although both Leval and Peirats were strongly opposed to governmental participation, the case for the CNT participation policy could not be better stated. Their willingness to give full consideration to policies they did not agree with earned my lasting respect. I sincerely regret that I could not feel the same way about Richards' shabby, ungenerous presentation.

Richards believes that the Spanish anarchists, instead of joining the united front republican government, should have abandoned the fight against Franco fascism and lived to "fight another day." He admits that "...such a course could well have ended in defeat in the first few weeks." when it was by no means certain that the fascists would win and hopes for final victory ran high. The anarchists would rightly be accused of cowardice and held responsible for the disastrous defeat by the masses who at that time were by no means ready to surrender.

Richards himself admits that the "...revolutionary expectations still ran high and the people still armed..."

This absurd strategy is based upon the unrealistic notion that the million and a half members of the CNT would accept such a proposal of the anarchists. There is very good reason to believe that the CNT members would indignantly refuse to be moved around like checkers at the behest of the "pure" anarchists. Without the CNT the comparative handful of anarchists would lose their influence and finally become an impotent sect absolutely incapable of meaningful action. The anarchist historian Peirats, for example, makes clear that while the anarchists did influence the CNT, the CNT made the "anarchists into its own image... provided them with a sphere of action, masses and positions of leadership... the anarchists were run by the union...." (Anarchists in the Spanish Revolution, p. 239) In a great many situations the CNT, instead of implementing the policies of the anarchists, acted independently.

Anarchists desperately searching for a practical anarchist alternative to governmental participation cite the example of the heroic exploits of the Nestor Makhno anarchist guerrilla movement in the Ukraine during the Russian Revolution as an example to be followed by the CNT-FAI. But they ignore the fact that this heroic movement was crushed and Makhno himself barely escaped abroad, a mortally sick man, to die in despair in Paris.

The perennial problem of what should be the role of anarchists in a revolutionary period is always relevant. Many are the lessons to be learned from both the mistakes and the achievements of our comrades; from the tragic events in Spain and its international repercussions manifested in the outbreak of the World War. Regrettably, neither Richards nor too many others have provided a reasonable basis for discussion.

From "Fragments: a Memoir", by Sam Dolgoff (Refract Publications, Cambridge, 1986)

Related Link: http://libcom.org/library/controversy-anarchists-spanish-revolution-sam-dolgoff
author by Andrew - WSM (personal capacity)publication date Mon Jan 01, 2007 21:16author address author phone Report this post to the editors

I'll start off by saying I don't see the direct relevence to Dolgoff's reply to Richards to either the Friends of Durruti or to the platformist movement today. Richards wasn't a platformist and although 'Lessons of the Spanish Revolution' was one of the easier texts to access in Ireland in 1992 a lot more is available these days. I mention this because the only reason I can see for the mention of the 1992 WSM article in the introduction is the that the author recommends Richards as a source - this is being discussed on a thread on LibCom at the moment so I guess Javier was inspired by that thread to post here.

Secondly I don't find the old anarchist saw of trying to compare anarchists who disagree with you to Bolsheviks as at all useful here. It is seldom a useful argument to make at all but in this case all sides can throw it at each other (for instance the CNT's insistence that principles had to be sacrificed in the interest of objective circumstances recalls much bolshevik apologetics around the need to sacrifice democracy to win that other civil war).

But the important point is the idea asserted in the introduction but not argued for anywhere that the Friends of Durruti and by extension platformists today were arguing for a dictatorship of sorts. As Javier provides no evidence for this serious accusation - indeed the article he links to actually argues that they did not advocate a dictatorship - it isn't really possible to argue against his assertion until he does so.

On the Dolgoff article itself I'm not sure how much there is to be said. He is keen to portray the decision to enter government as having being democratically reached within the CNT as opposed to being made by a bureaucracy. This is quite possible although it seems to me there is a question over to what extent CNT members were presented with a fait accompli.

But that aside, so what?

If it was a question of a bad bureaucracy then perhaps nothing would need to be learnt except preventing such a bad bureaucreacy in future revolutions. But if it was a question of an organisations of millions making the wrong decision then a more serious problem exists.

As I read the Friends of Durruti (FoD) and modern day platformists I think they are not making Richards argument that the decision was down to a bad bureaucracy. Instead they are arguing that the problem was with the CNT as a whole - a very different argument with much deeper implications.

In their 1938 pamphlet 'Towards a Fresh Revolution' the FoD far from blaming a CNT bureaucracy actually offered this explanation

"What happened, that the CNT did not makes its revolution, the people's revolution, the revolution of the majority of the population?

What happened was what had to happen. The CNT was utterly devoid of revolutionary theory. We did not have a concrete programme. We had no idea where we were going. We had lyricism aplenty; but when all is said and done, we did not know what to do with our masses of workers or how to give substance to the popular effusion which erupted inside our organisations. By not knowing what to do, we handed the revolution on a platter to the bourgeoisie and the marxists who support the farce of yesteryear. What is worse, we allowed the bourgeoisie a breathing space; to return, to re-form and to behave as would a conqueror."
"
http://struggle.ws/fod/towardshistory.html

Later they made it even clearer that the problem was politicial and not down to a bad leadership

""Although it had the strength, the CNT did not know how to mould and shape the activity that arose spontaneously in the street. The very leadership was startled by events which were, as far as they were concerned, totally unexpected.

They had no idea which course of action to pursue. There was no theory. Year after year we had spent speculating around abstractions. What is to be done? The leaders were asking themselves then. And they allowed the revolution to be lost."
"
http://struggle.ws/fod/towardsposition.html

The CNT leadership here are not portrayed as bad people but - like the rest of the anarchist movement - swept along by events for which they had not properly prepared for.

Incidentally for those who want to know a lot more about the background to these events being discussed their is a huge index of online documentation at http://struggle.ws/spaindx.html

On the Friends of Durruti an excellent history of them called The revolutionary message of the 'Friends of Durruti' is available at http://struggle.ws/spain/FODtrans/preface.html

author by javierpublication date Mon Jan 01, 2007 22:15author address author phone Report this post to the editors

Te relevancy to the plataformists today is to me that they make the same injustice to the spanish anarchists as Richards by oversimplifying the situation they faced. By reducing it to a problem of theory (while Richards reduced it to a problem of leadership, leaving theory intact, that is why I call him a purist and those who look for an answer in theoretical inquiry "revisionists") they ignore the situation and the dilemma they faced, I find this unfair and worst of all self-defeating. Should the situation arrise again (and we are all working on that) I beleive that plataformists would be as unprepared as the rest of anarchists becuase their (most commonly argued for) answer does not take into accout the real situation faced (problems and risks are minimized or not even mentioned, altough this is a generalization that would not fit many plataformists) and do not provide a clearly stated alternative that can get us out of the dilemma.

I am aware that I risked being interpreted as slinging mud by mentioning the bolsheviks, but I truly think that this dilemmas is not an anarchist dilemma bu a revolutionaries dilemma, no one has got the perfect answer (if it exists). I however clearly stated that "It could be argued", that there is "ambiguity" in their position (I have read the paper of the FoD and it is ambiguous at best, and I am not the fist one to say it, you can look at the debate at L’Espagne Nouvelle altough in spanish here: http://www.fondation-besnard.org/article.php3?id_article=61), and that "they coincide to some extent". I am not saying that you are the same as the bolsheviks (altough I do not consider that an insult) but I beleive that your position is not clear enough nor does it answer to the reality of the problem and it seems as if you have not realized it and its full implications (neither did the bolsheviks, and they also were ambiguous -look at The State and Revolution-). As you said, anarchists need theoretical reflection and debate and a good start for that is finding the weak parts of our theory.

Yes, the decission of the CNT of participating in the government is very un-anarchistic, altough the spirit in wich they did it was a lot different from that of the Bolsheviks. Also, as the war advanced and the shit and the blood began accumulating and they found themselves buried in it up to their necks they had even more un-anarchistic and late bolshevik positions (like the introduction of violence as a way of ensuring discipline in the militias -demoralised becuase of the concessions made and the chronic lack of weapons-), I would not defend this position.

The central point that I am advancing is not an accusation or an evaluation of the FoD position (that would require another article) but that there was a dilemma and what was the real situation faced and the implications of both alternatives, to understand why the comrades chose the course of action they chose (wich leads to the strangling and death of the revolution). That is something I see lacking in most essays on the subject.

I agree completely with this:

"If it was a question of a bad bureaucracy then perhaps nothing would need to be learnt except preventing such a bad bureaucreacy in future revolutions. But if it was a question of an organisations of millions making the wrong decision then a more serious problem exists."

But I clearly differentiated between richards position and the fod position (the FoDs central critique is to the lack of theory to answer to that situation, not to a bad leadership). What they both had in common was a rejection of the chosen course and a neglect of the situation faced by the movement, as Leval said:

"It only needs a modicum of common sense to realize that it was quite impossible for us to wage war against the other anti-fascist sectors who would not allow themselves to be wiped out so easily. It would have been a nonsense and a crime...."

It was indeed a tragic dilemma, not a problem of lleadership or theory (well, not having an answer that gets us out of that dilemma is a problem of theory, but no one has that answer, not even the FoD).

For example, when plataformists defend the FoDs position, wich included a call for the dissolution of political parties and a sort of government of the unions (with obligatory syndication in either de UGT or CNT, altough this part of the interpretation is debatable) they ignore the fact that it would mean opening up a new battlefront in the rear and thus reducing even more the possibilities of victory over the fascists (this dilemma presented itself not from day one of the revolution but a bit later, maybe a deccissive grab of the weapons and the gold and a split between the UGT and the CNT of both this key resources may have changed the course of the war, but it is mere especulation). When I read that kind of stuff I think that it is a hurried and flawed response, we need an answer, but most answers I have heard ignore the real complexity of the situation during the spanish revolution (and many others) giving easy comforting answers while not dealing with its full implications.

author by Andrewpublication date Mon Jan 01, 2007 22:51author address author phone Report this post to the editors

Thanks, its now clearer where you are coming from

I can't comment on the Spanish language debate you point to as my understanding of Spanish is very poor but on your other points ..

I think we need to distinguish between the Friends of Durruti and platformists today who see the FoD as one of a number of organisations to draw inspiration from.

The Friends of Durruti were publishing a paper and pamplets under difficult circumstances of censorship etc. Whether or not they were guilty of over simplifying is hard to reach a conclusion on but in any case they were living in the circumstances they talk of and had to choose what aspects to emphasise so if they were perhaps they can be forgiven.

In any case it would make no sense to say the surviving writings of the FoD represent all that is to be said on the Spanish revolution. Their value is quite clearly not in offering the most detailed history but in making a contribution that is not to be found elsewhere. But I wouldn't even recommend their pamphlet as an inital reading - only as something of importance once the basics were understood.

As to platformists today the vast bulk of what is published is in fact holding up the Spanish revolution as a positive example, including presenting the CNT as perhaps the best example of mass revolutionary organisation we have to date. No one, not even the WS article you link to suggests that the solution was simply the programme advocated by the FoD, that article says twice they were too little, too late.

But either the problem was a political one or it was one of bad leadership. The other conclusion you seem to suggest that it was an inevitable result of objective conditions leads one towards the conclusion that the revolutionary project is doomed for will we not always face similar conditions?

But of course the problem of discussion here is also one of simplification - it is hard for us in 300 word comments to do any justice to the actual difficulties of 4 years of war and revolution.

author by javierpublication date Tue Jan 02, 2007 00:34author address author phone Report this post to the editors

I agree with everything you said, but I will answer to this:

"But either the problem was a political one or it was one of bad leadership. The other conclusion you seem to suggest that it was an inevitable result of objective conditions leads one towards the conclusion that the revolutionary project is doomed for will we not always face similar conditions?"

Indeed we will face similar conditions (if we are lucky, intelligent and hard-working enough, because we can look at russia for even worse conditions for the anarchists) but our revolution will not be doomed until it is doomed, we will have to work and fight with hope and manouever as Bakunin said like storm pilots in the revolutionary seas. We will have to try because there is no other way but revolution, and we better start preparing now.

There is value in the FoD´s positions (as well as other examples like the Dielo Trouda group, the bulgarian plataformists, and many more) and they should be studied as responses advanced by anarchists on the ground (or on the basis of those crucial experiences), but we must also see why they were not heard (and altough there was censorship by the May Events it was not the sole motive they were not heard), only in that way will we learn the most from them and be better prepared next time. That is where this article gains relevance, it gives a balanced view of the situation the CNT faced. That is a failing I find in articles like the one I linked in Workers Solidarity.

As to the FoD´s positions, I said that they deserved another article and further investigation, but you can read in the same page as the debate y showed you many articles from their press, El Amigo del Pueblo.

And as to the position we should advocate during a revolutionary position, how to acomplish the neccesary unity while managing to have the needed independance to advance our positions and at the same time stop a dictatorship from killing the revolution in its name, I beleive that the FoD´s position is more or less right (as expressed here http://struggle.ws/fod/towardsposition.html in other issues like the May Days I have much more doubts) but I have my doubts on the functions they propose for a revolutionary junta. To me, "The supervision of revolutionary order" should be descentralized and in the hands of the free municipalities (wich are Bakunins communes, the sum of the workers associations), also a lot of things could be more clear or are missing from that text but I beleieve you are right that they can be "forgiven" (in them! not in us! and even less when we aproach a revolutionary situation).

If the UGT rejected that proposal (wich it would probably do) what should they have done? In Catalonia, they could have implemented it anyway (like they did in Aragon) but the CP would be even more able to rally around him all the petit burgeoise opposition, and so, how would the anarchits need to react?

author by Tom Wetzel - WSA (personal capacity)publication date Tue Jan 02, 2007 05:08author address author phone Report this post to the editors

"The only other alternative was an anarchist dictatorship" is the justification cooked up AFTER THE FACT by the CNT-FAI "influential militants". But this was not the way the ACTUAL debate happened in the CNT that led to Popular Front collaboration. What was needed was a unity of the working class and the creation of a unified command for the militia, the revolutionary army. In May 1936 at its congress in Zaragoza the CNT had committed to a "revolutiionary workers alliance" with the UGT. That suggests an alternative course to Popular Front participation. The alternative would have been to create, jointly with the UGT (and teh FOUS, the POUM's union in Catalonia) new working class-controlled structures of popular power, to replace the Republican government. If the CNT had overthrown the Commonwealth of Catalonia (the regional government headed by Companys) and invited the other unions to joint convention to set up new goverance institutions, a unified militia, etc., they would have had no choice but to go along, and if they boycotted, well, that's their choice, too. In fact they probably would not have boycotted, not for long.

Moreover, this proposal was ACTUALLY WORKED OUT in practice by the CNT in the course of six weeks of internal debate after July 19th. At a national plenary on Sept. 3 the CNT agreed to a proposal of a federalist network of national and regional defense councils, elected by the unions, and ultimately answerable to national and regional worker congresses. They proposed a unified people's militia to be run by joint commissions of the UGT and CNT. This would have put the unions in control of the armed forces. The Communists would not have been able to get control of the army, as they actually did later, by capturing the officer positions in a conventional hierarchical army. For information on this read the interview with Eduardo de Guzman in "Blood of Spain" and "Los anarquistas y el poder" by Cesar Lorenzo.

The problem is, the CNT was inconsistent in applying this program. They flip-flopped. After proposing to the CNT the national labor defense council to replace the Popular Front government, they joined the government of Catalonia on Sept. 26th, which told the UGT leaders they weren't serious, completely undermining their leverage.

In other words, joining the Popular Front government or taking power alone were not the only options facing the CNT. They could have created an exclusively working class governance structure with the participation and cooperation of the UGT. That isn't an "anarchist dictatorship".

But the idea of the CNT itself as the future structure of self-management of society seems to have confused people, kept them from thinking of similar self-managed structures, but embracing the other working class organizations as well.

In the liberated zone of eastern Aragon, the CNT did actually create a regional governance committee, a Regional Defense Council, that was supposed to be accountable to the congresses of collectivized communities, such as the Congress held in Caspe in Feb. 1937. Initially this defense council was established on the initiative of the CNT village unions, and later the UGT minority union was given some representation on the Council as well. They could have done the same thing for Catalonia.

author by Tom Wetzelpublication date Tue Jan 02, 2007 05:12author address author phone Report this post to the editors

I should have said, "After proposing to the UGT [not CNT] the national defense council, the CNT joined the government of Catalonia."

author by Tom Wetzelpublication date Tue Jan 02, 2007 05:27author address author phone Report this post to the editors

In July of 1936, the FOUS (the POUM's unions) were about as large as the UGT. The FOUS would have joined with the CNT. The PSUC were able to rally the middle strata (managers, property owners, farmers, small business owners, professionals) anyway, so not taking over didn't prevent that. That is why the UGT grew from 100,000 members in July 1936 to 350,000 by spring 1937. But I doubt they would have wanted to be excluded totally from power. When the CNT seized industries, the UGT often then approached them to make it a joint system of self-management, as on the railways, which were initially expropriated by the CNT.

author by javierpublication date Tue Jan 02, 2007 14:25author address author phone Report this post to the editors

I beleive you illustrate my point quite well.

Altough you seem to say that it was becuase of failings of the "influential militants" you do not address the fact that it was decided (altough many times only ratified after the fact as you have pointed) by many plenums of regionals and local federations of the CNT. In fact, between those influential militants that entered the government and publicly defended that position were militants opposed to it (like Garcia Oliver, who voted against it).

You say that this was not how the debate was understood by the CNT militants but give no proof of it, what can I say?, I don´t really know if they invented that formulation of the situation they tought they were in during the debate or after it was decided that the CNT should collaborate with the government.

You say that "The alternative would have been to create, jointly with the UGT (and teh FOUS, the POUM's union in Catalonia) new working class-controlled structures of popular power, to replace the Republican government" but fail to mention that it was proposed to the UGT and it was rejected (the UGT was not as democratic as the CNT, it was effectively controlled by the PSOE so what would you expect from them?). If they did so, you say that "they would have had no choice but to go along, and if they boycotted, well, that's their choice, too. In fact they probably would not have boycotted, not for long" but that is your optimistic outlook from a much more comfortable position, and one with much less responsibility, after all you are not taking deccissions that could lead to the victory of fascism.

What I am criticizing with this is not your criticism of the path chosen but how lightly you do it, how easy it sounds when you describe the situation, it seems as if they had been idiots or misguided by the wrong leaders. Do you beleive that what you advocate was not proposed? Why do you think it was not accepted? Is this a case of bureaucracy? confusions in the anarchists theory? or was it discarded as impossible (rightly or not)?

"The problem is, the CNT was inconsistent in applying this program. They flip-flopped. After proposing to the CNT the national labor defense council to replace the Popular Front government, they joined the government of Catalonia on Sept. 26th, which told the UGT leaders they weren't serious, completely undermining their leverage."

History is a bit more complex, first, the CNT proposed a defense council for catalonia hegemonized by the unions, and the UGT rejected it, so they accepted the composition of the central comitee of antifascist militias (of cataluña) in wich the socialists (and communists) had the upper hand because they were doubly represented through their party and both the UGT and the rabassaires. You say that they should had done it anyway and that the ugt would eventually accepted, the militants on the ground overwhelmingly beleived (altough there were minorities who opposed this view) that it would end up in open fighting on the rearguard (also, they tought this when they expected the war to be short, so this could be dealt with later).

Also, I have more questions, when they entered the popular front government, why did they accept so little and unimportant ministeries? Were they idiots or did they tought that it was the most they could get in such circumstances? Were they wrong?

You mention in your alternative that ti could be done with "the participation and cooperation of the UGT" and that is exactly what they didn´t manage to get (besides joint comitees in collectivizations).

"But the idea of the CNT itself as the future structure of self-management of society seems to have confused people, kept them from thinking of similar self-managed structures, but embracing the other working class organizations as well." This is to me a ridiculous claim, as you said, in the zaragoza congress it was contemplated an alliance with the UGT.

"In the liberated zone of eastern Aragon, the CNT did actually create a regional governance committee, a Regional Defense Council, that was supposed to be accountable to the congresses of collectivized communities, such as the Congress held in Caspe in Feb. 1937. Initially this defense council was established on the initiative of the CNT village unions, and later the UGT minority union was given some representation on the Council as well. They could have done the same thing for Catalonia."

Maybe they could, but the resistance in Catalonia would have been much, much stronger (Aragon had a lot less petit burgeoise and an overwhelming anarchist military presence, and diverting troops to catalonia was not an option). Even more on the many regions in wich the CNT was in the minority (like Madrid, were the treasury was located), etc. You say it could have been done and it seems as if you were suggesting that there would not be any armed resistance to the Unions taking power (and that all of them would have agreed to do so). That to me is very unlikely, and in the event of armed clashes on the rearguard, what to do? get some troops from the front to fight the socialists (leaving a hole for franco to spearhead into liberated territories)? wouldn´t the socialists do the same? This is exactly the debate of the May Days, this is exactly why the anarchist leaders capitulated, they knew that clashes on the rearguard could be fatal and made concession after concession until they killed the revolution.

They were wrong undoubtedly, but somehow most militants beleived it was the best possible course of action, ignoring the situation they faced is dangerous for the movment because it prepares it to face a strawman instead of the real struggle. Also, I beleive it is not fair towards the militants who sacrificed themselves on Spains revolutionary war.

author by Tom Wetzel - WSA (personal capacity)publication date Tue Jan 02, 2007 15:43author address author phone Report this post to the editors

Says javier:
"History is a bit more complex, first, the CNT proposed a defense council for catalonia hegemonized by the unions, and the UGT rejected it, so they accepted the composition of the central comitee of antifascist militias (of cataluña) in wich the socialists (and communists) had the upper hand because they were doubly represented through their party and both the UGT and the rabassaires."

This is incorrect. The CNT NEVER proposed to the UGT that the CNT and UGT jointly take power in Catalunya. In July of 1936 they did not propose creating a joint structure of control with the UGT. According to the account in Garcia Oliver's memoir, Eco de los Pasos, of the crucial debate in the regional plenary of July 23rd, where they decided to join the Anti-fascist militia Committee, they talked about the unions taking over and implementing libertarian communism. But that proposal was voted down.

Moreover, that is not quite the same as the more nuanced view they proposed later, in Sept., for a joint defense council and joint control of a people's militia. They didn't ask the UGT to endorse "libertarian communism". You may say, "But if they had tried to implement union political power, they would have had to approach the other unions to go along." Yes, but my point is that it seems they hadn't gotten that far in their program development. It seems to have taken them six weeks of further developments to come around to the proposal they made to the UGT in Sept.

javier: "Altough you seem to say that it was becuase of failings of the "influential militants" ".

That is not quite what I am saying. What i am saying is that their ideas were confused. It is true that they had committed to a "revolutionary workers alliance" with the UGT at Zaragoza, but, as Cedar Lorenzo points out in Los anarquistas y el poder, they never worked out concretely what that would mean. They had no concrete strategy for gaining power. Cesar Lorenzo says that because of this they "had to improvise in total incoherence after July 19th."

In regard to the national defense council, javier says I "fail to mention that it was proposed to the UGT and it was rejected (the UGT was not as democratic as the CNT, it was effectively controlled by the PSOE so what would you expect from them?)."

I do mention this, in my essay at: http://www.workesolidarity.org/spain.pdf

Moreover, it's not so clearcut. The UGT executive was controlled by the Left Socialists, i.e. Largo Caballero and his circle. Since 1933 they had been beating the drum for "proletarian revolution" and a "workers government." Now the CNT was giving them the opportunity to be true to their words. I think that in order to be persuasive, it would have helped greatly to create some facts on the ground, and seizing power in Catalunya, where they could have done it, would have provided that leverage. Certainly joining the Generalitat undermined their leverage. This is basically the opinion of Eduardo de Guzman, as expressed in the interview in "Blood of Spain" (spanish title is different, it is not "Sangre de Espana"). And de Guzman was managing editor of Castilla Libre, the CNT paper in Madrid.

Javier: "Do you beleive that what you advocate was not proposed? Why do you think it was not accepted? Is this a case of bureaucracy? confusions in the anarchists theory? or was it discarded as impossible (rightly or not)?"

It took them six weeks of debate to work out the idea of joint CNT-UGT defense councils. It was not a part of the Zaragoza program. And they obviously thought it was possible enough that Solidaridad Obrera mounted a major campaign for it in Sept-Oct 1936.

Javier: "Also, I have more questions, when they entered the popular front government, why did they accept so little and unimportant ministeries? Were they idiots or did they tought that it was the most they could get in such circumstances? Were they wrong?"

I think it was a question of having undermined their leverage with Caballero and the UGT. That's what joining the Generalitat did.

Javier: "You mention in your alternative that ti could be done with "the participation and cooperation of the UGT" and that is exactly what they didn´t manage to get (besides joint comitees in collectivizations)."

They were in a stronger position to get this in Catalunya. And at the national level the problem is, as Eduardo de Guzman points out, that they undermined their leverage.

Javier: ""But the idea of the CNT itself as the future structure of self-management of society seems to have confused people, kept them from thinking of similar self-managed structures, but embracing the other working class organizations as well." This is to me a ridiculous claim, as you said, in the zaragoza congress it was contemplated an alliance with the UGT."

But my point is that they never concretely said what that alliance would mean. It was envisioned as some negotiation with the top national exeuctive committee of the UGT, but there was program spelled out.

Javier: "Maybe they could [have overthrown the Generalitat], but the resistance in Catalonia would have been much, much stronger"

Again, the way forward was to bring in the other unions, so that it was a question of uniting the working class organizations. If they seized the industries and even the petty bourgeois businesses like haircutting, dairies and bakeries and apartment buildings, obviously that generated a huge amount of opposition. So, they were obviously not too afraid of generating petty bourgeois opposition in doing that. They would have been much, much stronger in resisting that opposition if they'd taken power. It was the failure to do so that enabled the PSUC/PCE, through its strategy of mobilizing and recruiting the petty bourgeoisie, to gain control of the state and thus have a rampart from which to attack the revolution.

Where would the armed resistance to the CNT taking power in July-Aug-Sept have come from in Catalunya? The Republican police and army hadn't yet been rebuilt.

The militants did the best they could with the tools they had to hand. But their ideology is one of those tools. You had people like Peirats, an editor of Acracia (which means "no power" right?) saying that it was adequate to have just a dispersed set of local committees to counter the fascist army. I think that is clearly mistaken. It had no traction among CNT members because they knew they needed unity with the UGT, with larger parts of the population, and that coordnation was needed.

What are the lessons that we are to learn from what happened in Spain?

author by javierpublication date Wed Jan 03, 2007 01:53author address author phone Report this post to the editors

The first paragraph you quote says that the defense council would be hegemonized by the unions, not that it would just the unions. Look at this part of what Leval said quoted by Sam Dolgoff:

"But in the face of the growing danger [fascist victory-S.D.] the greatest unification possible was needed. They thought up a revolutionary solution: the government should be replaced by a Defense Council of five members, five from the UGT, four from the republican parties, five members of the CNT. In this way they sought to make clear the supremacy of workers' syndical organizations over the political parties. [Ibid., p. 3221"

This is what I am referring to, and yes, there were long deliberations (by the national plenum of regionals in madrid as its says a bit after that) until 3 September 1936, in wich it was agreed as a strategy. The Zaragoza congress did not contemplate that indeed and that is why these deliberations were needed, it was not something that leaders could decide on their own. And yes, it was a failing of the zaragoza congress (I have not read its resolutions yet, but I will accept your claim that they had not reached that deccission), but I must stress that the congress had to deal with the reunification of the CNT and it was a mass organization of more than a million and a half memebers, it wasn´t as clear as it had to be, maybe the FAI failed in this regard too by not proposing it beforehand so as to channel the debate and preprare the militants to the needed resolutions. So again I say, criticisms are okay, not contemplating the situation in wich errors were made is not.

"According to the account in Garcia Oliver's memoir, Eco de los Pasos, of the crucial debate in the regional plenary of July 23rd, where they decided to join the Anti-fascist militia Committee, they talked about the unions taking over and implementing libertarian communism. But that proposal was voted down."

It was voted down not because of idealism or fear of power but because of strategic considerations, mainly that the cnt could not win the war by itself and that both the base and most "influential militants" beleived that an agreement with the UGT was needed, and that meant concesions (the same happened in the international arena, protecting foreign enterprises from expropiations, etc). They expected by this to get at least some support (mainly being able to get arms) but had a limited success.

"Yes, but my point is that it seems they hadn't gotten that far in their program development. It seems to have taken them six weeks of further developments to come around to the proposal they made to the UGT in Sept."

I agree, but see why. it is inexcusable in us (altough these matters require a very well tought position by organizations and thus should not accelerate the debate), it was not in them.

So the question is, could they have taken power in Catalonia? and you ask "where would the armed resistance to the CNT taking power in July-Aug-Sept have come from in Catalunya?"

To the first question, they obviously could, they were in control of the arms and were a majority organized and hardened in the struggle, even after the recomposition fo the state and the loss of much of its forces to the front. The May Days proved it.

To the second question, first there were the Assault guards, also, they could received arms from other parts of Spain and arm the rabassaires and the petit burgeoise like it happened in other revolutions (like the French), altough the majority of the militias were manned by the CNT there were considerable numbers of socialist and communist controlled militias, they could have abandoned the front as they threatened doing during the May Days, that would have forced the CNT to do the same thus leaving a gigantic hole for franco to spearhead into the libertaed territories. Also, the republicans could have started a sabotaging campaign and conspire to set a deal with Franco.

It was not a matter of confusions or bad leadership (altough both had a certain impact on the CNT militants) but, of a dilemma. I do not know if carachterizing the alternative as an anarchist dictatorship is fair or accurate, but it seems obvious to me that there would be resistance and a new battlefront would be opened if your strategy was implemented thus reducing the chances of success in the war against Franco (wich I must repeat, was beleived to be a short one at first so this problems could be dealt with later). This is what Leval said, you disagree, we can´t know but I beleive that reducing the problm to one of confusions and bad leadership is unfair because the risks were quite clear and people aswered to them, you may desestimate them but I repeat that theirs was not theoretical especulation but a decission that could mean the victory of fascism.

It would be much more clear if you explained what meant to you to take power in Catalonia (maybe I am ignorant but I beleive most people who talk about taking power are rather obscure as to what it means in concrete terms)? Was it to confiscate all the weapons in the hands of others than the unions? what would have stopped then the republicans from joining the UGT as they did later?

Acracia does not exclusively mean no power, it has many definitions, like anarchist, it could mean no rulers or many other things, you should ignore the name and look more into the positions of Peirats as he gives one of the best accounts of the history of the spanish revolution form the point of view of a militant anarchist revolutionary that we have.

The most pressing question for revolutionaries in a revolution is how to reach the neccessary unity to defend the revolution while leaving the people enough freedom to advance the revolution, leninists took a clear stance and consider the debate closed even after seeing the results of that stance. As anarchists we have to answer that question but we better avoid simplisms (and ambiguities as there are to be found aplenty in marxists answers) in our analysis, lets acknowledge the risks as they are instead of dismissing them. And tackle this with humility as it is probably the biggest problem we will ever face (again, if we are lucky, dedicated and hard working enough as our comrades were).

author by Tom Wetzel - WSA (personal capacity)publication date Wed Jan 03, 2007 04:45author address author phone Report this post to the editors

javier: "it seems obvious to me that there would be resistance and a new battlefront would be opened if your strategy was implemented thus reducing the chances of success in the war against Franco"

First of all, the POUM was trying to encourage the CNT create a joint council of the working class organizations, so they would have enthusiastically accepted such a proposal from the CNT. The only other groups with militias were the Esquerra and the PSUC. They would not have liked the idea, but just as their unions went along with expropriation of industries where the UGT was a large force (railways, public utilities), they would have had to go along here.

What the CNT actually did was far worse at undermining the war against Franco. The PCE/PSUC was beating the drum for reconstruction of the state so that they could weasel their way into control of the hierarchical officer corps in the army and police, and that is what they did. And there is lots of evidence that this had a tremendously demoralizing effect on the people's army -- Orwell and Peirats argue this. In "Blood of Spain" there is a Left Socialist, a Marxist, who says the Communists "acted with the wildest sectarianism" in the army and created great demoralization.

Moreover, the increasing power of the Communists, which was inevitable if the
Popular Front strategy was followed, led to Stalin's control of the flow of arms, and thus denying arms to the anarchists. When Garcia Oliver proposed organizing a guerrilla army in the mountains of Andalusia, Negrin initially agreed but had to back down because the Soviets veto'd the idea because they didn't want an anarchist guerrilla army they couldn't control. That would have been a hugely important initiative, to harry Franco's army from the behind the lines in the south.

Javier: "It would be much more clear if you explained what meant to you to take power in Catalonia (maybe I am ignorant but I beleive most people who talk about taking power are rather obscure as to what it means in concrete terms)? Was it to confiscate all the weapons in the hands of others than the unions? what would have stopped then the republicans from joining the UGT as they did later?"

No, taking power would mean starting out by creating some basic institutions of governance in line with the Zargoza program, such as regional worker congress to which all the assemblies, including union assemblies of other unions such as CNT or FOUS, would elect delegates. If the unions had delegates in proportion to membership, CNT would be a majority but other unions would not be frozen out. What became very clear by August was the need for a unified command to fight Franco. The system of diverse party and union militias was not working. So, the idea would have been to create a unified militia. The "workers alliance" proposal concretely was for joint CNT-UGT control of the militia, to have a unified command. The idea is that the regional worker congress has the equivalent of legislative or policy making authority, and the defense council or militia coordinating committee carries out these policies in the field of management of the war effort and the military, police, courts.

the idea should have been to have representation on the basis of workers and
residents of neighborhoods, not on the basis of party leaders, irrespective of ideology. There were plenty of supporters of the Republicans who were members of the CNT and UGT unions. No doubt sympathies with Republican ideas would be expressed at assemblies or congresses.

javier: "look more into the positions of Peirats as he gives one of the best accounts of the history of the spanish revolution form the point of view of a militant anarchist revolutionary that we have."

well, i did do that. Peirats' position, as i pointed out, was for a very dispersed system of local and regional committees and collectives. He was against any overall coordination, which was simply not possible. this is why he opposed both the Popular Front collaboration and the national defense
council proposal.

Javier: quoting Leval: "But in the face of the growing danger [fascist victory-S.D.] the greatest unification possible was needed. They thought up a revolutionary solution: the government should be replaced by a Defense Council of five members, five from the UGT, four from the republican parties, five members of the CNT. In this way they sought to make clear the supremacy of workers' syndical organizations over the political parties. "

Actually, Leval conflates two different proposals. The original proposal on sept. 3rd was for a National Defense Council with NO Republican representatives, an exclusively working class representation, 7 members of UGT, 7 of CNT. That was modified at another national plenary Sept 15th to the proposal described by Leval, to try to respond to UGT complaints that the "anti-fascist petty bourgeoisie" needed to be included. The CNT might not have had to make these concessions if it had taken over in Catalonia. Or, at least, it could have
avoided the even more humilitating concessions it made when it joined the existing government on Nov. 4th.

javier: "The most pressing question for revolutionaries in a revolution is how to reach the neccessary unity to defend the revolution"

Yes, but the thing is, there were different ways to achieve unity. That is my point. The view that I put forward here is also basically the view that Ron Fraser came to, after his very extensive interviews with hundreds of
veterans of all viewpoints in the 1970s. He's not an anarchist -- he's a Marxist of some type -- but I think he's right. Marxists, especially if they're Leninists, will say that what is needed is to capture control of a state precisely to have the unified power to defeat the opponents of revolution. We need to show how that unity and coordination can be achieved in a way consistent with left-libertarian politics.

there are thus two ways to understand the dilmma. the way that was propounded by the "influential militants" after Nov. 4th 1936 is the opposition between "anarchist dictatorship and Popular Front collaboration". I'm suggesting that the alternatives were new working class controlled institutions in which all the unions participated, versus Popular Front state power.

author by javierpublication date Wed Jan 03, 2007 13:03author address author phone Report this post to the editors

Tom:

Rereading Peirats (Los Anarquistas en la Crisis Política Española, Ediciones Utopía Libertaria, 2006) will help clarify the matter, i will not quote too much because I ahve it only in spanish bu the chapter I am basing myself the most is the XIII.

First: check the orobon fernández group (wich peirats supported) proposal for a revolutionary alliance between the CNT and the UGT, that is what happened in 1934 in Asturias, the UHP (Unión the Hermanos Proletarios, Union of Proletarian brothers), so there were not only practical proposals for the unity between the UGT and the CNT before the civil war, but they were tested on the battlefield two years before the civil war. I have heard enough criticisms to the lack of prevision and foretought of the CNT and everytime if I look a bit at the issue I find the contrary, so I will discard it as an irritating myth (Peirats agrees with this too)..

The POUM´s unions were insignificant outside of catalonia (they were an small escission from the CNT there) and in Catalonia the CNT had the majority already. According to Peirats, altough the Central Comitee of Antifascist Militias of Catalunya was composed of all the antifascist organizations, it was hegemonized by the CNT-FAI. So in catalunya it would have made no difference because the CNT was already in the majority and in the rest of the country it would not have mattered because the POUM was very small. The same happened in Aragon, the situation was worse in Levante and incomparable in the centre of Spain.

The demoralizing effect of the course chosen is crystal clear, but Peirats disagrees with you when you say that "they would have had to go along here". Indeed, the situation was much more complicated. he agrees with me in that in such a situation the risks are very high and many times fear of making a fatal mistake makes people (even revolutionaries) accept things they would not accept in other circumstances. Peirats, while criticizing the bureaucratic tendencies that were taking hold in the CNT and its growing collaborationism is very honest in that they had very strong arguments to support that position, and that those who opposed it (like him) knew that they simply had no alternative. he quote a report to the congress of the AIT from the CNT enumerating the dangers they faced and the critical situation they were in. It says that they could have tried to win with just their forces but it would open three battlefronts, against the fascists, against the government, and against foreign potencies. Peirats adds that to many influential militants there was no other option besides collaboration with the government but an anarchist dictatorship, wich they rejected not because of ideological motives, but because it was a suicide (actual word from peirats). It describes that in Catalonia they were masters of the situation, but they lacked the necessary forces to win the war and the government was reconstituing itself rapidly because it had arms and it had money, and it was boycotting them in every possible way, and added to that they were blocked from buying weapons by the non-intervention of britain and france. This is oficially why they tried to negotiate a share of the power of the government. Your beleif that the UGT would have followed the CNT is just that, a beleif not shared by the majority of the militants on the ground. Largo Caballero (PSOE) was the general secretary of the UGT and by september he was the head of government. An alliance from the base like the one that happened in 1934 in Asturias (and not in the rest of spain) would have been the only alternative, but it was extremely difficult (remember, that alliance happened with the right on power, not with the socialists and republicans on power, now that they had the control of the flow of money and arms they were in a privileged position to impose not an alliance of equals but the CNT collaboration with their policies). Peirats agrees with me again (as a matter of a fact, I agree with him, it mostly is his opinion wich I have adopted after reading a bit on the subect), the opposition (including him) had no plausible alternative that would "at the same time save so many precious things as: triumph in the war against fascism, the marching forward of the revolution, integral fidelity to their ideals, and the conservation of their lives".

The weak point of your argument is not the criticisms to the course followed but your lack of considerations of the huge problems that the alternative you propose would have faced if it was tried. This is the problem.

For example, the guerrilla in Andalucia, of course it was a great idea, but the CNT had NO ARMS to establish a force there, so the government had VETO POWER over that initiative, they had the arms.

I more or less agree with your idea of taking power, wich is like the program of the friends of durruti wich I have already referred to.

Peirats rejects the National Defense Council proposal of the National Plenum of Regionals celebrated in Madrid the 15 of September 1936 because he says that it was a carbon copy of the government but with the names changed to sound less authoritarian, it included the republicans, the marxists and the cenetistas.

The September 3 meeting is not mentioned by Peirats.

"The CNT might not have had to make these concessions if it had taken over in Catalonia. Or, at least, it could have avoided the even more humilitating concessions it made when it joined the existing government on Nov. 4th."

We will never know but the majorty of the militants on the ground did not think so or were not willing to try with all the risks it implied. Not mentioning that is what I criticize.

You say:

"there are thus two ways to understand the dilmma. the way that was propounded by the "influential militants" after Nov. 4th 1936 is the opposition between "anarchist dictatorship and Popular Front collaboration". I'm suggesting that the alternatives were new working class controlled institutions in which all the unions participated, versus Popular Front state power."

I will advance thirs way to understand the dilemma, one that is both more clear and realistic:

either concessions to other sectors to gain unity and thus opening the play in a way that would allow them to strenghten their position, or profundizing the revolution in a way that could lead to armed conflict on the rearguard and thus greatly reducing the chances of wining the war

am I being fair? Look at the situation in wich they faced the dilemma and tell me if they hadn´t got reasons to accept making concessions

There is a part in the Hym To the barricades that says:

"Even if death and pain awaits us, against the enemy duty calls,
The greatest good is freedom, it is to be defended with faith and valour"

Maybe they lacked faith in the power that the revolution would unleash,maybe they tought that revolutionary enthusiasm was not enough, that they lacked weapons and would not be able to fight at two fronts. You say that there would be no new front that the socialists would play along, we will never know but it sounds as faith to me and I do not know if you will accept faith as the guide of your acts if your life and the revolution depended on the correct choice.

author by Tom Wetzel - WSA (personal capacity)publication date Wed Jan 03, 2007 15:04author address author phone Report this post to the editors

javier: "According to Peirats, altough the Central Comitee of Antifascist Militias of Catalunya was composed of all the antifascist organizations, it was hegemonized by the CNT-FAI."

He is wrong. the anti-fascist miltia committe had only 3 of the 12 positions held by CNT-FAI. And in practice each organization used its own positions as it wanted. There was no unity. It was a disfunctional scheme. On the composition see Cesar Lorenzo, Los anarquistas y el poder.

Javier: "The POUM´s unions were insignificant outside of catalonia "

But my point was precisely about the importance of taking power in Catalunya. The FOUS/POUM could not be ignored there, with 70,000 members. The UGT in July of 1936 did not have many more members. The POUM had gained control of the CNT union federations in Lleida and Girona, and quite a few of the unions in Tarragona, and the printers union in Barcelona, and had the only farmers union to the left of the Esquerra's rabassaires' union.

javier: "So in catalunya it would have made no difference because the CNT was already in the majority and in the rest of the country it would not have mattered because the POUM was very small. The same happened in Aragon, the situation was worse in Levante and incomparable in the centre of Spain."

It obviously would have made a tremendous difference to bring in the other unions. There were also independent unions outside the CNT and UGT and FOUS. The local federation of Reus was independent because it had both marxists and anarchists in it and they didn't want to split it by affiliating to UGT or CNT. Most importantly, it would have answered the criticism that they were intending an "anarchist dictatorship." It was necessary precisely to construct a *class* power.

Javier: "they could have tried to win with just their forces but it would open three battlefronts." Again, a false dichotomy. see what i said in the previous paragraph.

javier: "Peirats adds that to many influential militants there was no other option besides collaboration with the government but an anarchist dictatorship, wich they rejected not because of ideological motives, but because it was a suicide"

"Anarchist dictatorship" wasn't the only alternative to joining the government. creating a *class-wide* institutional structure, to unite the class, was the alternative.

javier: "For example, the guerrilla in Andalucia, of course it was a great idea, but the CNT had NO ARMS to establish a force there, so the government had VETO POWER over that initiative, they had the arms."

And why didn't they have arms? Becuase they went along with Popular Front participation and thus played into the hands of the Communists. That is precisely my point. Not overthrowing the government in Catalunya only ended up undermining the war effort against Franco.

javier: "Peirats rejects the National Defense Council proposal of the National Plenum of Regionals celebrated in Madrid the 15 of September 1936 because he says that it was a carbon copy of the government but with the names changed to sound less authoritarian, it included the republicans, the marxists and the cenetistas."

He's not looking at the proposal of Sept. 3rd, which was an exclusively CNT-UGT governing council. And he says it was "just a government under another name" which means he can't distinguish between a state and a working class-controlled polity, which the CNT was trying to evolve the Spanish polity towards. That's a classic anarchist error.

Javier: "The September 3 meeting is not mentioned by Peirats."

Again, read Cesar Lorenzo, Los anarquistas y el poder.

javier: "We will never know but the majorty of the militants on the ground did not think so or were not willing to try with all the risks it implied. Not mentioning that is what I criticize."

The other alternative was free of risks? I think it was a worse alternative in terms of probable results.

javier: "I will advance thirs way to understand the dilemma, one that is both more clear and realistic: either concessions to other sectors to gain unity and thus opening the play in a way that would allow them to strenghten their position, or profundizing the revolution in a way that could lead to armed conflict on the rearguard and thus greatly reducing the chances of wining the war"

This completely overlooks the division of Spanish society into classes. This is not a trivial issue. It is very important that the other unions were working class forces, even if more bureaucratic and with a different ideology. The same can not be said for the party leaders and especially the Republicans and Basque Nationalists.

author by javierpublication date Thu Jan 04, 2007 04:15author address author phone Report this post to the editors

According to Marrow the central comitee of antifascist militias of catalonia has 15 member, 5 from the cnt-fai, 3 from the ugt, 1 for the poum, one for the psuc, one for the rabassaires and 4 for the republican parties. I don´t have cesar lorenzo´s book nor enough time to do a better research but most sources I have checked say that it was in fact hegemonized by the cnt-fai.

I am not dscussing this claim: "It was necessary precisely to construct a *class* power.", it was period, I am pointing at the dificulties of doing it and why it was not done because you make it sound so simple that we must think that either you are wrong in that respect (that it was simple) or that the cnt had confusions wich prevented them from doing it, or a reformists bureaucracy. I am for the first option, It wasn´t as clear as you seem to say that it was possible or the best course of action, most people on the ground agreed with that and that is why they voted for concessions.

You quote me saying that "they could have tried to win with just their forces but it would open three battlefronts." and answer "Again, a false dichotomy". It is you opinion and somehow when the events were happening and with much more debate that this we are having and with a lot more data and knowledge of the situation most people didn´t think so. This is my point, maybe they were wrong (they were wrong in the sense that they ended losing the war and the revolution, but that does not make the alternative any better, you think it was better, they thought it wasn´t) but It is important to understand why. Your comments seem to offer confusions in anarchist ideology as an explanation, I point to concrete risks of your proposal wich you dismiss as exagerated or non-existant. It was how militants (militants who had built one of the largest revolutionary unions in history and who fought and organized during bloody dictatorships resisting exiles, prision and murder) overwhemingly perceived the situation (an undeniable fact) so if you want to insist that it was because of confusions instead of the risks associated by your proposal you better offer some evidence because you can look at lots of documentation, speechs, press articles and testimonials from that time evaluating those risks. There were many minority groups wich thought that they were making a huge mistake, SOME of them beleived that there was an alternative and they propagandized it, but most beleived they were wrong and continued anyway. We may never know, but any history of the spanish revolution that does not take into accout this fact is lacking. I will not repeat my argument because its tiring and I don´t have much time with a computer.

Im will try to find information about the proposal of september 3 that lorenzo says was made.

By "just a government under another name" he referrs to other proposal (wich does include republicans as well as marxists and cenetistas) as you say in the previous paragraph so this is lacking any substance.

"can't distinguish between a state and a working class-controlled polity, which the CNT was trying to evolve the Spanish polity towards. That's a classic anarchist error." Wow, you call yourself anarchist? So what are the free municipalities, the communes, and the many, many proposals that anarchists have made? That they should be directly controlled by those affected by their deccissions and that they were legitimate only as long as they did not violate certain principles (freedom, equality, solidarity) is a common theme in the ideals advanced by most anarchists. But being controlled by the unions or workers organizations does not automatically make them acceptable to anarchists, they may take authoritarian deccissions, they do not have a white card, we do not make a cult of organizations.

yo quote me saying that "We will never know but the majorty of the militants on the ground did not think so or were not willing to try with all the risks it implied. Not mentioning that is what I criticize" and answer "The other alternative was free of risks? I think it was a worse alternative in terms of probable results."

Risks it had as we can see the results, I do not deny that, again, I admit that they failed and thus they were probably wrong, but that does not make your proposal any more right and there is some motive why it was considered that "it was a worse alternative in terms of probable results", you say confusions, I say risks. We may disagree in this regard but this paragrapgh summarizes the disagreement.

I said "I will advance thirs way to understand the dilemma, one that is both more clear and realistic: either concessions to other sectors to gain unity and thus opening the play in a way that would allow them to strenghten their position, or profundizing the revolution in a way that could lead to armed conflict on the rearguard and thus greatly reducing the chances of wining the war" and you answered that "This completely overlooks the division of Spanish society into classes. This is not a trivial issue. It is very important that the other unions were working class forces, even if more bureaucratic and with a different ideology. The same can not be said for the party leaders and especially the Republicans and Basque Nationalists".

It does not overlook it, that is why I used lots of conditionals, again you beleive that the cnt could drag the working class base of other organizations and I say maybe, I do not deny it and indeed think that it is what we must do, but it is not so easy and trying it could lead to armed conflict on the rearguard (and even less support from foreign countries, russia would have sent 0 weapons), that is why it was rejected to me.

The conditions in wich a revolution happens will most probably be extremely adverse, it will not propagate like fire in a cloth saturated with alcohol (look at the russian revolution, the insurrections it inspired were crushed all over the world) nor will it take hold on all territories and peoples from the start, there will be war and this war will be waged not by a homogenous block but by a coalition of many different opposing organizations. No matter what you say I beleive that Unity in that conditions will never be something we can manage easily and with no violent clashes, it will be our primary challenge. However, I agree with you that the way must be class unity from the base upwards, and I add, in two separated organizational structures, one economical and one political, trying to ensure as much descentralization (as it allows for greater control) and direct democracy. This must be combined with a joint command of all revolutionary forces for the war effort and coordination organisms in multiple levels and spheres for the economy.

author by Tom Wetzel - WSA (personal capacity)publication date Thu Jan 04, 2007 06:00author address author phone Report this post to the editors

Javier, I do not mean to dismiss or make light of the risks. Nor am i saying that carrying off the proposal for bringing unity of the different unions would be easy. I think that the life and death struggle would have made it easier, because they all knew they had to come together.

But the CNT was the most massive revolutionary union ever, in words of Ron Fraser in "Blood of Spain": "the most revolutionary mass union organization ever to emerge in a European country". If we can't achieve this under that sort of circumstance, when can we?

About risk: "It was how militants (militants who had built one of the largest revolutionary unions in history and who fought and organized during bloody dictatorships resisting exiles, prision and murder) overwhemingly perceived the situation "

Yes, I know. De Santillan'sappeal at the crucial July 23rd plenary that approved collaboration with the Popular Front in the Antifascis Militia Committee was almost entirely to fear. No doubt this had an effect. But that is not the way to lead in that type of situation. Fear can be paralyzing and that is not what they needed.

In Eco de los Pasos, Garcia Oliver says that it was the "petty bourgeois anarchist intellectuals" who were more motivated by fear. He says that the hardened working class militants, who had risked their lives, and been in and out of jails, were less afraid of the risks.

In regard to the defense council proposal you say: ""can't distinguish between a state and a working class-controlled polity, which the CNT was trying to evolve the Spanish polity towards. That's a classic anarchist error." Wow, you call yourself anarchist? So what are the free municipalities, the communes, and the many, many proposals that anarchists have made? That they should be directly controlled by those affected by their deccissions and that they were legitimate only as long as they did not violate certain principles (freedom, equality, solidarity) is a common theme in the ideals advanced by most anarchists. But being controlled by the unions or workers organizations does not automatically make them acceptable to anarchists, they may take authoritarian deccissions, they do not have a white card, we do not make a cult of organizations."

The free municipalities are local assemblies in villages and neighborhoods, and local federations of these, as across a metropolitan area. But what we're discussing here, and what was needed, was a way to unify the working classacross larger regions, all of Spain.

I think the CNT wasn't just proposing that the defense councils would be controlled by the unions. This is clear from the one case, in Aragon, where they actually did carry out the defense council program. There the regional congress of the collectivized communities was intended to elect and control the defense council. So, this means that, at the national level, there would have had to be a national congressof delegates from the base assemblies, and the elimination of the Cortes. How is that inconsistent with social anarchist principles?

javier: "No matter what you say I beleive that Unity in that conditions will never be something we can manage easily and with no violent clashes, it will be our primary challenge."

As I say, I do not mean to give the impression that what i am suggesting would have been easy. But in either case they would need to negotiate a path forward with organizations that have different ideas and traditions.

javier: "However, I agree with you that the way must be class unity from the base upwards, and I add, in two separated organizational structures, one economical and one political, trying to ensure as much descentralization (as it allows for greater control) and direct democracy. This must be combined with a joint command of all revolutionary forces for the war effort and coordination organisms in multiple levels and spheres for the economy."

Okay, let us end, then, in agreement, as I do not disagree with you about the difficulty and risks associated with a class-unity strategy that would fundamentally attack the Republican state.

author by javierpublication date Thu Jan 04, 2007 11:22author address author phone Report this post to the editors

You say that "In Eco de los Pasos, Garcia Oliver says that it was the "petty bourgeois anarchist intellectuals" who were more motivated by fear. He says that the hardened working class militants, who had risked their lives, and been in and out of jails, were less afraid of the risks", but the CNT was not an organization full of "petty burgeoise intellectuals", it was an organizations of "hardened working class militants, who had risked their lives, and been in and out of jails" so somehow these "petty burgeoise intellectuals" did indeed convice them of the course of action. Also, it was not just "petty burgeoise intellectuals" who defended collaborationism nor were critics devoid of them.

In regards to the social organization after the revolution I had no big diagreements, but I pointed out that most organized (the majority when the movement was strong) anarchists did indeed support some variant of that. It is not "inconsistent with social anarchist principles", it is not an "anarchist dictatorship", as Malatesta said, its like confusing self-defense with agression.

"Okay, let us end, then, in agreement, as I do not disagree with you about the difficulty and risks associated with a class-unity strategy that would fundamentally attack the Republican state"

So be it.

author by Kim Keyser - Anarkismopublication date Thu Jan 04, 2007 22:28author address Oslo, Norwayauthor phone Report this post to the editors

I thought this discussion in fact was very constructive and informative. Thanks!

I do neither believe in easy answers, and it is easy to simplify in order to fulfill the need of providing a good example to refer to. However, I do think Tom is making some very good points about workers seizing power, even though it would've been risky.

I think we can extract more or less universal lessons from the Spanish revolution. However, some times it seems like we anarchists be talking of "if they just had did it like that" (though, as this debate shows it' s not a matter of "just"). And after all, I think the Spanish revolution would've failed nonetheless, due to the international situation.

Could it spilled over to France? Yeah, that's not unlikely at all. Could it have radicalized the international workers movement to such a degree that the national ruling classes wouldn't have dared to deploy their armies to crush the Spanish revolution, in fear of their own working class revolting? For instance in countries such as the US, Canada, UK, Scandinavia, etc. Perhaps. But could it have radicalized the international working class to such a degree that even the Nazi state or the Stalin state wouldn't dare to intervene? I don't think so. (No one knows though).

The "best" thing that could've happened would've maybe been that the crushing of Spain, laid the foundations for a later, culmination of class struggle (kind of like 1905 laid the foundation for 1917), instead of being reduced to a heroic, but nevertheless isolated and doomed revolution?

Of course, this is just mere speculation. My point was that I think the international aspect tends to get neglected. One important lesson is also that we need larger, better and more efficient prefigurative organizations internationally coordinated to succeed. It's a an incredible challenging task indeed (!). It's still what need to be done though.

I don't expect fellow anarchists to disagree on this, but I thought it was worth pointing out. Maybe some of you have your own thoughts on these questions?

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